Dissertating Daze

*sighs*

I had sent an update to my committee about my progress and a question about my last chapter. It has been 6 months since I last updated them. To be frank, I was a bit apprehensive that I've been out of touch and had not produced another chapter since last year. But I received a very quick reply from all three of them and I am so lucky that I have the most supportive committee. I've heard nightmarish stories of committee chairs from my friends who in some cases broken down in tears. But not me thankfully.

I apprised them of my progress and that while I was working on my revisions and my conclusion, I told them I was unsure that my fifth chapter was appropriate. It was a case study on a spate of hate crime incidents at LMU in the 2004-2005 academic year. It was suppose to be this theory/praxis tension but it turned out to be an op-ed piece than a dissertation chapter. I really don't want to write another chapter, but this was seriously weak. Well I did get some constructive feedback and the verdict is ... *drum rolls* ... I'm writing a new fifth chapter. One committee member summed it up and said that it just didn't fit with my overall project and doesn't support my main argument in which I'll elaborate in a later post. But it really stuck out like a sore thumb compared to the other chapters. More importantly, she said that writing a dissertation is already a lot of work. You don't want to be in a situation where you have to spend more time trying to make a chapter fit when it really doesn't.

And I agreed ... reluctantly but I am relieved to know that my worries were verified.

Luckily, at around the same time, I came across a US Supreme Court case called Virgina v. Black (2003). Like many Southern states, Virginia has a statute banning cross-burnings as part of the effort to eradicate the KKK. It's roots are in post-Civil War Reconstruction efforts and 14th Amendment enforcement. However, the statute was challenged on the grounds that it violated First Amendment protections using the ruling in RAV v. St. Paul, MN (1992), in which the city of St. Paul, in a well-meaning statute, banned all forms of prejudicial and biased displays that include racial epithets, cross burnings, etc. That ordinance was challenged on First Amendment grounds and the US Supreme Court agreed. For many proponents of anti-hate crime legislation, this was seen as a major setback. It wasn't until a year later, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), where sentencing enhancement features were also challenged on First Amendment violations, that the constitutional validity of hate crimes legislation was affirmed. In this case, the Court ruled that discerning bias, that is, a motivation and intent based upon a real or perceived difference, to determine the level of punishment for those found guilty, is constitutional.

Anyways ...

So the constitutional question in the Virginia case is: Does Virginia's prohibition on cross burning with the intent to intimidate any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment?

Yes. But in a plurality opinion, delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, four justices held that a state is perfectly within its right to prohibit specific forms of speech such as cross-burning. However, a provision in the Virginia statute stated that cross-burning was prima facie evidence of intent was ruled unconstitutional by three justices. Justice Scalia argued that the Court should vacate and remand the case to the Virginia Supreme Court to review the provision, while Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Kennedy concluded that the statute altogether was unconstitutional. Only Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

I became extremely interested in Justice Thomas's dissent. I've only glossed over the case and, in particularly his opinion, but it starts out with a statement about culture:

In every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 422-429 (1989) (REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting) (describing the unique position of the American flag in our Nation's 200 years of history), and the profane. I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic example of the latter.

I'm interested in this case because my dissertation examines how the law, or the "State," constructs and represents "hate" as an object of knowledge. Much of the anti-hate crimes effort at the State level is spent producing a working definition of "hate," but that definition is based upon, in part, on questions about culture. It's not exclusively about values per se, but ideologies and discourses about practices and representations of "hate" as a historical phenomenon and a contemporary social/political problem. Justice Thomas's dissent, and in various parts of Justice O'Connor's opinion, have cultural arguments about representations of hate.

Anyways ... that's where I'm at. Back to researching and hopefully a strong chapter.